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Marshner: A Logician's Reflections on the Debitum

A LOGICIAN'S REFLECTIONS ON THE
DEBITUM CONTRAHENDI PECCATUM:sr.
The long-standing theological debate over whether Our
Blessed Mother can be said to have had a debitum peccati begins and ends, it seems, with both sides admitting the truth
of the following contrary-to-fact condition:
.
(A) If she had not been preserved, Mary would have contracted original sin. 1
The necessity of affirming this or similar counterfactuals is
usually said to lie in the Church's doctrine that Our Lady's
redemption was a "preservative" redemption. It is asked, what
can "preservative" mean, if an assertion like (A) is not true?
Of course, once (A) is admitted, it seems to become more
difficult for those who reject the debitum peccati to maintain
their position. For if (A) is true, there must be some reason,
cause, or law which makes it true-a law to which Mary was
"subject." The defenders of the debitum can claim that the
term means no more than this; whereupon they seem to win
by default.
The purpose of the present writer is rather a radical one-:
it is to prove that the debitum peccati is a logical absurdity.
I argue that its defense does indeed require, as starting point,
a true and informative counterfactual. (A) is excluded because it is a thinly disguised tautology. I then experiment with
*The author wishes to thank Fr. ]. B. Carol, O.F.M., for his kindness
in reading an earlier draft of this paper, and Prof. Carl Kordig of Georgetown for his advice on formal logical matters. Their suggestions and
criticisms have greatly improved the present version, whose remaining
shortcomings are solely, of course, the author's responsibility.
1
Fr. C. BaliC's proposal at the 1954 International Mariological Congress: "B. Virgo Maria peccatrtm originate contraxisset, nisi praeservata
frtisset." Cf. Virgo Immamlata 11 (1957) 499.
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alternative counterfactuals and find them, one and all, unacceptable.
The overall argument, then, falls into two parts. The first
part seeks to reduce the entire case for the debitum peccati to
the tenability of a counterfactual, and the second part attacks
that tenability, especially in the light of recent work by formal
logicians on the meaning of the counterfactual connective. This
work may fairly be said to have begun .with a paper of H. Hiz
in 1951,2 and was well summarized last year by Howard C.
Wasserman. 3 To this writer's knowledge, such work has never
before been applied to the debitum question.
The present article contains, however, only the first part
of the total argument; the second will be published in a sequel,
which will be entitled, A Critique of Marian Counterfactuals.
In order to avoid all appearance of theological polemic, the
author has rarely attributed the various positions discussed in
the two parts of this paper to the particular theologians, living
and dead, who held them. As a result, no attempt has been
made to supply a bibliography of the traditional literature,
since this work has been done ably by others.4
0.0.1. It will be granted that the debitum peccati, if ~rue, is

a theological conclusion. Theological conclusions are supposed
to emerge from the data of revelation (and sometimes also
from those of right reason) as bonae consequentiae. Hence
2
H. Hiz, Comments and Criticisms on the Inferential Sense of Contrary-to-Fact Conditionals, in The Jomnal of Philosophy 48 (1951)
586-587
8 H. C. Wasserman, An Analysis of the Cormterfactual Conditional, in
Notre Dame fomnal of Formal Logic 17 (1976) 395-400.
4 What may well be the definitive bibliography has been prepared by the
eminent American Mariologist, Fr. ]. B. Carol, O.F.M., in The Blessed
Virgin and the "Debitttm Peccati." A Bibliographical Conspecttts, in
Marian Studies 28 (1977) 181-256. The bibliography appears considerably
enhanced in Father Carol's new book, A History of the Controversy over
the Debitum Peccati (Franciscan Institute Publications, St. Bonaventure,
New York, 1978).
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it would seem that a case for holding the debitum must proceed
by constructing one or more syllogisms whose conclusio~ is
the· desired proposition. In this case, it is easy to see wh~t sort
of syllogism is required: one needs a major :w:hich p!'edicates
rrd~bet peccatum contrahere" of all· the members of a certaiq
class; and one needs a minor which identifies Mary as a member of that class.
0.0.2. Secondly, one must assume that debet is to mean something more than "wou~d have." If the reader is already convinced that Our Lady's debitum is untenable unless it only
means that she "would have" contracted original sin, had God
not prevented it, he must await the sequel to this pape~. Here,
we are concerned with theories which give debet some unconditional force of "owe," "ought," "had to" or "sho~ld have."
0.0.3. This distinctive force brings to light a second requiremen_t which the syllogism establishing the debitum peccati must
meet. Whereas the notions of original sin, who con~racts it;
why and how, are all revealed (more ot less), the notion of a
"necessity" or "obligation" to contract it is not revealed. Hence
the major of the required syllogism ( s) cannot presuppose or
merely posit the "obligation." Rather, the "obligation" itself
must emerge as the sound conclusion of a theological proof.
· 0.0.4. Now before we investigate how such a syllogism might
be constructed, let us face a more primitive option. Suppose
we already have our desired syllogism in hand, with its desired
conclusion: Maria debet peccatum contt·ahere. The fact remains that she didn't contract it. So the option is this: should
we say the obligation was waived, or the necessity dissolved,
in her case? It would seem so. But notice that if an obligation
is waived, it is waived. That person for whom an obligation
is waived is, precisely, not obliged. Hence, if the obligation
was waived in her case, Mary was not obliged to contract original sin~ and the stipulated syllogism is false.
0.0.5.' Here the defender of the debitum has three moves
from which to choose.
·
·
· ·
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(1) He can accept th'at Mary was not really obliged and
thus reduce his own position to· a matter 'of words. He can say
that the quarrel was a matter of words from the outset.' But
one must retort that, if he still speaks ·of a debitum, then his
use of words is inconsistent.
(2) He can raise the obligation to the second power, so to
speak. Suppose the descendants of Adam, if not oblig~d to
contract, are at least obliged to be 'obliged to contract. Then
Our L~dy was obliged to be obliged, but ·God didn't in fact
oblige her. In other words, it remains true that she "ought
to have been obliged."5 However, as soon ·as one sees that
the basis for alleging the. obligation to be obligated is no di£-'
ferent from the basis for alleging the obligation in the first
place, it becomes clear that this solution only postpones the
problem. One then considers a third move.
·
··
(3) The defender of the debitum can say that in Mary's
case the obligation was not waived. In that case, she was truly
obliged or necessitated but was mercifully prevented by God
from r.peeting the requirement. In this way, one arrives at a
debitum peccati which seems to have substance. There is a
debitttm "in" Our Lady which consists precisely in the real'
attachment to her of that necessity which her Savior preserved
her from fulfilling. Subject to a·"law" of God's making, she
broke it by God's doing. Because God broke His own law,
she lacks the sin; because He broke it rather than w;uved it,
sh~ has the debt of sin. On this interpretation, the desiderated
syllogism is restored to g<>?d repute.
·

So far as I can see, there are no other options for the debitum-:
defender. He may choose to word the third option a bit differenlty than I have done, but the gist will remain so long as he
s Such is the position taken by those who defend the debit11m remotum;
at least in some versions. Cf., for example, G. M. Roschini, O.S.M., II
problema del 'debitrtm peccati' in Maria Santissima, in Virgo Immac11lata

11 (1957) 343-355.
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holds that there is an obligation or necessity which did bind
Mary and was not simply waived.
0.0.6. With this choice clarified, we turn to the needed syllogisms. We have seen that both the notion of debitttm and
its attachment to Mary must be demonstrated, presumably in
that order. I think it will be agreed that there are only two
possible starting points: either the revealed data concerning
original sin and its transmission or else the meaning of the
Immaculate Conception itself.
1.0.0. Let us see what happens if one begins from the data
on original sin (the so-called termintts a qtto of Our Lady's.
redemption) .il From these data, one or more "laws" must
emerge (taking "law" in a broad and analogical sense), so
that Mary's case, considered in abstraction from the divine intervention, emerges as a case covered by a law.
1.1.0. The first task, then, is to get clear the "laws" in question.
6 Recent theological reflection has proposed substantially new ways
of understanding these data. For example, M. Flick and Z. Alszeghy,
in their Fondamenti di rtna antropologia teologica (Libreria Editrice Fiorentina, 1969), provide a large bibliography. Because the new tendencies
are very diverse, and in some respects discordant among themselves, it
would be tedious to take all of them into account in the argumentation
of this paper. Indeed, it is not clear that the problematic of the debitum
can even arise according to some of these views. Nevertheless, even if
there is a tenable theology of original sin within which the debitrtm issue
cannot arise, there are certainly other tenable views within which it can
continue to arise, at least in some form. For example, nothing essential
to the debit11m problem depends on whether or not the referent of the
proper name "Adam" is a single, physical person. Nor does it matter
whether our solidarity with Adam be conceived primarily in juridical
terms or in mystical terms, so long as some bond of solidarity is affirmed.
Therefore, the mode of exposition adopted in this paper is intended to be
as non-committal as possible with respect to these options. Moreover,
since the debitrtm issue arose historically in the context of a more "juridical"
understanding of original sin than is often maintained today, it is reasonable
that an attempt to dispose of it permanently should dispose of it even
within the terms of that juridical understanding.
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1.1.1. Law I says: 'You shall not eat of such-and-such a tree."
Prescinding from mythological coloration of its content, some
such injunction must be posited in harmony with the Catholic
insistence that man's predicament as "fallen" results from an
original, free choice of disobedience. The injunction is analogous to social legislation. It is broken by Adam and Eve,
and their punishment is expulsion from the Garden plus the
unfavorably altered conditions of life corwected therewith.
These new and unhappy conditions include (a) absence of
original justice, (b) absence of the preternatural gifts, (c) subjection to the Devil, (d) onerous labor; (e) concupiscence, etc.
For convenience' sake, I shall refer to this collection of characteristics henceforth as [a, b, c...]. Now, these characteristics
play a double role. Considered vis-a-vis Adam's act, they are
a punishment. Considered vis-a-vis God our End, they are
a state-of-sin and incur the further punishment of eternal. exclusion from the friendship of God. This double role is possible, of course, because of the peculiar character of the privation of grace. 7
The disobedience of the first parents did not take place, however, in a vacuum; it occurred within a unique, supernatural
"situation" or "structure" (Adam's headship or corporate personality), which can be defined in part by a second "law."
1.1.2. Law II says: "If Adam sins, both he and all those
in solidarity with him will be characterized by [a, b, c...).8
7 Within the order actually established by God, the absence of grace
in man is never mere absence but always also privation. It is' in this
light that the above-noted Janus-character of privatio gratiae is the ultimate justification for the Church's constant praCtice of describing an
ontologically negative state of affairs (absence of grace) in axiologically
negative terms (peccat11m).
·
8 The term "solidarity" is ambiguous, because man's solidarity with
Adam seems to be revealed with respect to two distinct points, namely:
solidarity with. him as acting either to keep justice or to lose it, and
solidarity with him as ancestor (seminal containment). It will be argued
below, in harmony with what appears to be a consensus of theologians,
that mere seminal containment in Adam, or descent from Adam, considered
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Notice that this "law" is not at all analogous to sociaL legislation. It is not the.law which Adam broke, because it is m;>t
the sort of thing that anybody can "break." . It is analogQ'!lS
to a law of nature in that- it states what will universally occur
under certain conditions. The coming-into-operation of Law. II
is therefore in consequence of Adam's sin but not precisely
punishment for it. The characteristics [a, b, c ... ] are the punishment. In other words, if Law II comes into operation, I
am born with these characteristics. Because these characteristics are ghastly, their existence in me can be called both "sin"
and "punishment.~' · It is not unjust that I receive these ch.aracteristics, because, thanks to his moral headship of the race,
I was "in" Adam and died "in" him, when he broke Law I
within the structure of Law II. Hence it is fitting that he and
I receive the same penalty, which is the bearing of the same
guilt. In any case, from the point of view of Adam's desc~d
ants, the "punishment" which follows upon Adam's sin is these
~haracteristics as actually received in his descendants-and not
the coming-into-operation of Law II. Now, given that one' is
to receive these characteristics, the question remains how one
is to do so. Forth~ answer, one needs another law.
purely as a biological relation, is not a sufficient condition for the contraction of original sin, although it is a necessary condition. Moreover, in
recent polygenic theories, while· it is denied that there was an original
pair from which all the preseqt human population is biologically descended,
nevertheless it is usually affirmed that the present population is descended
from some original group which either (a) sinned collectively, or (b) stood
in special relation of corporate solidarity with the physical person ("Adam")
who did sin. On the latter hypothesis, a child born today will have the
same corporate solidarity with Adam but will not necessarily have a biological descent from him.· Whether such hypotheses are acceptable in
Catholic theology is not at issue in" this paper, and no reliance will be
placed upon them. Rather; it will be assumed here that it is theologically
correct to say that all men are "biologically descended" from Adam.
Nevertheless, the existence of such hypotheses does provide an additional
motive for the darificatory convention which has been adhered to. throughout this essay: . the term "descent" and its cognates are used exclusively
to signify a biological· relation of ancestry, while the term "solidarity" is
used solely to signify the moral or corporate or mystical bond ..
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1.1.3. Law III says: "If human parents are characterized by
[a, b, ·c ...], then by natural generation their children who, are
in solidarity with Adam will have [a; b, c...].9
1.1.4. Now, if these distinctions are kept in mind, it becomes
clear that the term "original sin" is an ambiguous one. It
can mean:

( 1) what Adam did,
(2) the consequeil.~e. of what Ada~ did, t.e., the operation
of Law II,
. (3) the consequence of that consequence, i.e., the characteristics [a, b, c...] as received in those having solidarity with
Adam, or even
·
,
( 4) the operation of Law III upon the human race.
9 The expression "natural generation" is, of course, ambiguous. A common theological opinion excludes from "natural generation" any conception in which male and female gametes do not fuse according to the
usual course of nature. (Hence the virginal conception of Jesus would
b~ exempt from Law III.) But this view has awkward consequences, to
say the least. It is now reasonably certain that a human being can be
produced by cloning; some biologists think that· even a natural parthenogenesis is possible. Other biologists would argue that in the case of identical twins (or triplets, etc.), where a single fertilizatum has divided in the
first days to produce two or more distinct embryos, what has rel!-llY occurred is an atypical form of reproduction, so that the adult parents are
really the grandparents of the twins. All these cases would ·give· rise to
persons exempt from Law III, hence devoid of original sin, according to
this view. Therefore, it seems better to define "natural generation" in a
way broad enough to cover all such cases as are not supernatural q11oad
mbstantiam. We may state the matter this way: the finality of ·~natural"
generation is not simply the communication of human nature but also
its communication to a human person. Thus a "supernatural generation"
quoad substantiam could only arise if the Person receiving the human nature
were not a human person-as when the Logos was conceived in His
human nature. Such ·a case could preserve the descent from Adam but
·not the substantial naturality of the generation itself. By contrast, a
modally: supernatural generation, such as the' miraculous conception of
Isaac or Samuel, would preserve both ·the descent from Adam and the
substantial naturality of the human generation.· On this ·View, the term
"natural" as used in the phrase "natural generation," will contrast with
_.,. :
"supernatural," but not with "artificial." · •· · . .,
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1.1.5. Fortunately, the phrase "to contract original sin" is
not ambiguous· at all. It clearly means: "to have solidarity
with Adam in what he did and hence, by Law II and III, to
receive the characteristics [a, b, c... ]. "
1.1.6. Alas, it is not so clear what one should make· of the
phrase, "to have to contract original sin." If we attribute to
Our Lady a debitum peccati, do we mean:
( 1) that she was (or should have been) in solidarity with
Adam in what he did?
(2) that she was (or should have been) subject to the operation of Law II?
(3) that she was (or should have been )subject to the operation of Law III?
We shall have to consider these possibilities separately. We
shall proceed in the order stated.
1.2.0. Can it be said that Our Lady was in solidarity with
Adam in what he did?
This question would have been formulated by many older
theologians in a more vivid way. They would have asked
"whether the Blessed Virgin sinned in Adam," and I, too,
shall use this form of words in the following exposition, simply
because it is less cumbersome. In using the more vivid formula,
I do not wish to be understood as endorsing the questionable
theory which holds that, because our wills were transferred to
Adam and hence were committed with his will in his sinful
act, we can be said to have "sinned" in Adam in some metaphysically literal sense. 10 It suffices for present purposes that
· 1 0 Theological usage of the phrase "to sin in Adam" undoubtedly
stemmed from a dubious interpretation of Rom. 5:12. Today exegetes
are generally agreed that Jerome's version, in q11o [Adam} omnes peccavemnt should have been rendered as eo q11od omnes peccaverrmt. Nevertheless, parallel Biblical data fully legitimize the expression that all "died"
in Adam. These parallel data seem to provide the proper understanding
of Trent's own usage of Rom. 5:12, namely, that the peccat11m transmitted
to us is not the act but the state-of-sin or mors animae.
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our solidarity with Adam (whether juridical or mystical, neither
or both) be conceived in such a way that we really bear the
moral effect of his act (the resultant state-of-sin) just as much
as he did. In other words, I assume only the common teaching
that the act of sinning is to the state of sin as cause is to effect.
The state of sin (privation of grace) is not a physical effect
of the culpable act, of course, but its moral effect. The moral
causality of the act consists simply in this: if x sins, then God,
in view of the act, ceases to conserve in being the grace of x.
On this interpretation, to ask "whether x sinned in Adam"
will not presuppose that x somehow acted in Adam, nor that
Adam's act as such can be imputed to x; it will simply be to
ask whether God ceased to conserve in being (or. foresaw that
He would not conserve in being) the grace of x in view of x's
solidarity with Adam.
The question at hand, then, is whether the answer to this
question is affirmative, when one substitutes "Mary" for 11X."
1.2.1. The correct way to answer this question is to explore
the interrelations of four open sentences. One wishes to know
whether these four sentences are equivalent, that is, whether
they are satisfied by exactly the same set of arguments and hence
have the same extension. The four open sentences are the
following (the verbs are to be taken as tenseless) :
(a) x is descended from Adam;
(b) x contracts original sin;
(c) xis in Adam as moral head of the race;
(d) x sins in Adam.
1.2.2. One can say of any human being, begotten in any way
from the existing human stock, that he or she is descended
from Adam, hence was "seminally contained" in him. Thus
the extension of (a) includes Our Lord as well as Our Lady.
1.2.3. But one cannot say of all human beings that they contract original sin, for at least Our Lord and Our Lady have not.
Hence the extension of (b) is not identical to that of (a) .
1.2.4. The difficulty is to decide which persons were in Adam
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/marian_studies/vol29/iss1/12
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as moral head of the .i:ace: -It is obvious that everyone who
sinned · iO. ·Adam was "in" him as head. But one may ask
whether everyone who was in Adam as head also sinned in
him. 11 Beyond doubt, this question must be answered in the
affirmative; for a negative answer would falsify the in quo
omnes peccavemnt of Romans 5:12, as interpreted by Trent.
The reason for this is the fact that our "solidarity" with Adam,
insofar as it means anything more than the biological relation
of descent (see above, note 8), is revealed and definable solely
with respect to a single point, kil., our solidarity with him
as acting either to keep justice or to lose it. Hence to suggest
that someone might have been "in Adam" morally or mystically
without having also died in Adam through his sin is to speculate
in thin air. Therefore, the extensions of (c) and (d) are
identical.
·
1.2.5. Next, one may ask whether everyone who sinned in
Adam has contracted (or will contract) original sin. Again,
the answer must be affirmative. For what can it mean to say,
of a person who never contracted original sin, that he or she
nevertheless sinned in Adam? If Mary, for example, does not
bear in herself the full set of characteristics [a, b, c... ), then
what reality in her corresponds to this alleged property of
having sinned in Adam? If one admits, in harmony with the
obvious tenor of the Ineffabilis Deus, that no reality in her corresponds to sin, then to say that she sinned in Adam is to say
that she sinned but has. no sin-which is contradictory. Furthermore, the Council of Trent makes it clear that the characteristics [a, b, c...), as actually received in us, are, or include,
a real peccatum (D.S., 1512), which is identified with the
mors animae. This peccatum will have to be understood either
as the act-of-sin, which would have to be a free operation (if
not free in us, then ·free in Adam) or else as the state-of-sin
1 1 Cf. the intervention.of Karl Strater, S.]., in the public debate over
the debit11m during the International Mariological Congress in Rome
· (1954), in Virgo Immacrtlata 11 (1957) 490-491.
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which resl1lts from such an act (if not from our own act, then
from Adam's) . But if the free· act causative of the sin-state is
not in us (as it is not), it can only be found in him with whom
we are in solidarity. Hence, on either hypothesis, the characteristics received in us are precisely peccatum if, and only if
we sinned in Adam. Conversely, if anyone sinned in Adam,
he or she really sinned. (It does not help to add the mitigating
words 11radicaliter," 11virtualiter,'' 11 extrinsece," and the like;
after all, species non mutat genus.) Now, if the same person
has committed no actual sin, then the real sin-act or sin-state
in that person can only be the inherited one; namely, the characteristics [a, b, c. . .]. Hence a person sinned in Adam if and
only if he has (or will have) the characteristics [a, b, c... ] .
Therefore, to have "sinned in Adarri" and to "contract original
sin" are fully equivalent expressions. To deny either is necessarily to deny the other. The extensions of (b), (c) and (d)
are thus identical. Therefore, since it is certain that Our Lady
did not contract original sin, it is also certain that she did not
sin in Adam. 12
1.3.0. However, can it be said that she should have sinned
in Adam? A defender of the debitum will have to say this,
if he intends the debitum to have a strong sense. He might say
l.2 Not a few of the older theologians (e.g., Suarez) did affirm that
Mary had sinned in Adam. In more recent times, however, partly on
the strength of arguments similar to those adduced above, there has been
a definite trend away from so crude an expression, although some still
use it. See the abundant bibliography compiled by ]. B. Carol, O.F.M.,
art. cit., in Marian St11dies 28 (1977) 181-256.
It is important to note, however, that the real plausibility of the case
for including Mary in Adam's moral headship does not lie in the grounds
disposed of above, but in a more basic consideration, namely: Our Lady
needed to be redeemed. Is it not the case that humanity, precisely insofar
as it is in need of redemption, is humanity in solidarity with Adam?
How, then, can Our Lady have needed redemption if she was not included
in Adam, at least by right? This question is addressed below, section
2.1.0ff. Father Carol informs us that he is writing a lengthy paper on
this very question entitled, Reflections on the Problem of Mary's Preservative Redemption, which he hopes to publish in Marian St11dies, Vol. 30.
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it on any of three grounds:
( 1) Our Lady was "in" Adam as moral head of the race,
hence debuit peccare in illo;
( 2) Our Lady was descended from Adam, hence "should
have been" in him as moral head of the race, and hence should
have sinned in him.
(3) Our Lady was a naturally begotten descendant of Adam,
hence "should have been" in him as head, and hence should
have sinned in him.
1.3.1. Now the first of these grounds plainly cannot be true.
We have already seen that everyone who was in Adam as moral
head also sinned in him, otherwise the in quo omnes peccavertmt is false; but we have also seen that Our Lady did not sin
in Adam; therefore, she cannot have been in him as moral head
of the race.
1.3.2. The second ground is more modest. It argues that
any descendant of Adam, by that fact alone, "ought to have
been" subject to him as moral head, hence "ought to have"
sinned in him, hence "ought to have" contracted the original
sin. The trouble with this argument, as with any argument
based on descendency alone, is that there is no way to stop it
at Our Lady. Jesus Christ, too, was veritably son of David,
son of Abraham, and son of Adam, as the genealogies of
Matthew and Luke teach. Will anyone claim that He, too, had
a debitum contrahendi peccatum? If not, this ground by itself
is insufficient to sustain the conclusion. 13 And if descendency
will not suffice, the burden will have to be shifted to "nah1ral
generation."
1.3.3. Can it be held that Our Lady should have been in13 The opinion of St. Thomas (III Sent., d. 3, q. 4, a. 1, in c.) that
"caro Christi secundum quod fuit in patribus, et etiam in ipsa Beata
Virgine, peccato infecta frtit antequam assumeretur; sed in ipsa assumptione ab omni infectione peccati purgata est ..." has long been abandoned
in Catholic theology. Cf. ]. M. Alonso, C.M.F., El debito del pecado
original en Ia Virgen. Reftexiones criticas, in Revista Espanola de
Teologfa 15 (1955) 72-73.
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eluded in Adam's fall because of the way she was begotten?
This argument, with its caro infecta or equivalent device, is a
classic whose refutation may be more conveniently handled
below (1.10.0), when we consider Our Lady's possible subjection to Law Ill.
1.3.4. Here it will suffice to show why mere descendency
from Adam does not entail, of itself, that one was "in" Adam
as moral head or sinned in him. It is usually classified as certa
in theologia that natural generation is not the cause but only
a condition sine qua non of the propagation of original sin. 14
Now descendency from Adam, considered purely in itself, is
simply a relation to Adam as ancestor. It is a real relation,
whose fundamentum in re is the generative power as reduced
to act in Adam or in one of his offspring. Therefore, all that
natural generation produces, of itself, is the child and the relation to Adam as ancestor. It does not produce the relation to
Adam as head. This latter relation is verified only by the actual
or foreseen receipt of Adam's sin, that is, the characteristics
[a, b, c...]. After all, it is also considered certain in theology
that the sin of Adam is the "causa unica" of original sin as
propagated in his descendants. 15 Now, if it is true that all who
were "in" Adam as moral head did sin in him, and if "to sin in
Adam" is really identical with "to contract original sin," then
any person who does not contract original sin cannot have been
really in solidarity with Adam as head. In Our Lady's case, it is
most probable that she was related solely to the New Adam
as head, because she was to be a member of the New Humanity
from the first instant of her existence. This is not the case with
the rest of us, who become members first of the Old,Man (by
conception) and only subsequently of the New (by baptism).
Hence the rest of us Christians have a relation to both heads
of the race, but Mary to only one. This situation is intelligible
14 See, for instance, ]. F. Sagiiez, S.J., De Deo creante et elevante, in
Sacrae Theologiae S11mma (ed. 4, Matriti, 1964) II, 996ff.
u Cf. Sagiiez, op. cit., 990.
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so long as one bears in mind that the fundamentum in re for
our relation to Adam as moral head is not simply biological
descent but the actual or foreseen receipt in us of original sin.:16
Absent this receipt (as in Our Lady's case), a person is related
to Adam solely as ancestor. Thus the relation to Adam as ancestor and the relation to him as moral or mystical head are
two distinct relations, having distinct fundamenta, even if
the existence of the first relation is a necessary condition for
the existence of the second.
1.3.5. Thus, to resume, we have so far· two negative conclusions: the debitum cannot mean that Our Lady either sinned
in Adam or, simply qua descendant, should have sinned in him.
We thus eliminate one version of the so-called debitum proximum. What remains?
1.4.0. Well, one could shift the emphasis away from the difficult question of exactly how Our Lady is related to Adam as
head. One could maintain that she, quite apart from that ques:te Undoubtedly, if one seeks to establish causal order, one must say
that we receive the characteristics [a, b, c ... } because we are related
to Adam as head, not vice-versa. Why, then, do I appear to argue the
reverse, namely, that we are really related to Adam as head because we
have or will have [a, b, c ... }? The order I have stated is the order of
causae cognoscendi notiores quoad nos. We have no other basis than the
actual contraction of sin for ascribing solidarity with Adam to a particular descendant of his. Therefore, I argue that in the ordo inventionis
we have absolutely no basis for ascribing this solidarity to Mary. This
contention does not alter the fact that, in the mystery of God's Providence,
there is a true cause (notior in se) whereby such-and-such particular
persons were foreseen in solidarity with Adam.
Was Mary foreseen by God, in any way, as among these persons? On
this question the debitum controversy often turns. It is sometimes said
that Our Lady's receipt of sin was foreseen by God and decreed in His
efficacious will that Adam be established in mystical solidarity with
"many," and yet that her receipt of sin was never actualized by God,
having been replaced by the contrary decree of the Immaculate Conception. This is the notorious problem of what order is to be assigned among
the signa rationis. It will be discussed below, l.S.Off., when we consider whether Mary could have been subject to Law II in principle but
made an exception to it in fact.
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tion, was nevertheless both Adam's descendant and born of sinful parents; hence she was, by right, subject to the operation of
some law of original sin's transmission. By far the most common understanding of the debitum peccati among theologians
in recent times has been just this conception of the debitum
as a "subjection" to a law similar (but not quite identical) to
those formulated above. At the same time, the most common
way to deny any debitum in Our Lady has been to deny that
she was subject to those laws. This denial has almost always
involved an appeal to the logical order of the divine, eternal
decrees. Here a different, and perhaps more decisive, approach
will be adopted.
1.4.1. What does it mean to say that someone is "subject"
to a law?
1.4.2. The answer is fairly clear so long as the context is one
of social legislation. In this sphere, I am "subject" to a law
if, when I disobey it, some authority has the right to punish
me. Thus to be subject to a law is to be a member of a particular class of persons, namely, those persons who are bound
to obey a certain authority (e.g. the citizens of Italy) and whom
that authority has justly bound with respect to the particular
matter legislated upon.
1.4.3. In the case of a moral law (even when the moral norm
is not reflected in positive legislation), the situation is closely
analogous. There is a legislator (God) and a promulgation
(whether conscience or revelation). Abstractly, all men are
at all times subject to the moral laws; but concretely, each man
is subject to a particular moral law only insofar as he finds himself in the particular situation ( s) in which the performance
or avoidance of a certain action is morally obligatory. For example, to say (abstractly) that I am bound by the moral law
against duelling means (concretely) that I must abstain from
duelling if I am ever in the circumstances which would count
as an instance of that offense. Thus, again, to be "subject" to
the law is to belong to the class of persons who find themselves
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in the particular circumstances within which the law applies.
1.4.4. Both in the case of societal laws and in that of moral
laws, one is subject to a law which one can break, although
it is unjust to do so. Hence laws of both kinds are laws of
which it is meaningful to say that one "ought to obey" them.
Here there is an analogy with Law I} the law to which Adam
was subject and which he broke.
·
1.4.5. The situation is· markedly different, however, if the
context is one of nature and its law-like regularities. There is
a physical formula, commonly known as the "law" of gravity,
to which it is reasonable to say that I am "subject," since I
belong to the class of bodies having mass. But no one will
say that I am legally or morally "obliged" to keep this law
(which I cannot break in any case), because its breach would
not be a crime but a miracle. Now, it has been suggested above
that the laws of original sin's transmission are more closely
analogous to this sort of law than to social or moral laws. If
this claim is true, it will be meaningless to speak of an "obligation" to obey them, and only nonsense will result from the
attempt.
1.4.6. Such nonsense, alas, is not hard to find in the literature on the debitum problem. Here is how it arises.
One takes any revealed truth about who contracts original
sin, why, or how. One observes that this fact is true by God's
own ordinance, which is necessarily just. Then one says that
a just ordinance "ought to be obeyed" by all those subject to
it. Thus, by arguing from God's justice, one concludes to a
proposition which predicates "ought to obey the ordinance"
of all members of a certain class. And thus one obtains a major which includes debet. Then the minor makes Mary a member of this class, and it follows that she debuit oboedire.
Against this debuit} the fact that she non oboedit is irrelevant.
1.4.7. The trouble with this solution is its remarkable silliness. It turns peccatum originate originatum into a benefit of
"law and order." Mary was obliged to contract the sin, it
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seems, because otherwise she would flout the house rules of the
Oeconomia! But lest I be accused of answering this position
with sarcasm alone, let me point out how it equivocates on
legal obligation. Consider the panorama of a myriad generations of parents, tainted with original sin, dutifully begetting
children having the same taint. By surprise, Joachim and Anne
beget an immaculate child. A "law" has been broken. But
who was responsible for keeping the law? Did Joachim and
Anne "owe it" to God, or to their species, to beget a sinner?
A fortiori: did the child "owe it" to her parents, or to God,
to be a sinner? The question answers itself. After all, ex hypothesi, God made the child immaculate. She didn't make herself. It is not as though Our Lady, declining to be a sinner, resisted existence until, by sheer contrariness, she managed both
to be and to be immaculate. Therefore, the "obligation" to
obey, like the obligation to uphold this law rested squarely
up<;>n God, not upon the child. The so-called debitum was His
not hers.rr
I think the collapse of this solution throws a new and decisive light on a point which I have mentioned heretofore only
in passing.
1.4.8. The notion of "obligation to contract original sin" is
neither revealed nor unambiguous. The debitum-defender must
first define it, then prove that what he has defined attaches to
Our Lady. As we hav~ just seen, the ordinary notions of legal
and moral "obligation" make no sense in this context whatsoever. And the reason is not far to seek. Any argument to the
effect that Mary was obliged to contract sin because she was
obliged to obey a just ordinance equivocates in no less than
three distinct ways. First, it treats a supernatural arrangement
which is in many ways analogous to a regularity of nature as
though it were analogous to just, social legislation. In this
17 See a variation of this argument skilfully elaborated by ].-F. Bonnefoy,
O.F.M., in Q11elqt~es theories modernes d11 'debit11m peccati,' in Ephemerides
Mariologicae 4 (1954) 322-323.
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way, an idea of "obligation" is introduced where it has no
place. Secondly, having made this blunder, such an argument
attaches the obligation to the wrong party. It makes no sense
to daim that Mary, or even Mary's nature, was "obliged" to
keep a law which neither she nor her nature could possibly
transgress. Since only God could break the "law," the argument would prove God unjust, if it proved anything. Thirdly,
such an argument strangely forgets that original sin is a punisment. Original sin in tts is the receipt of the characteristics
[a, b, c... } as defined above. But the receipt of these characteristics is the receipt of a punishment. Now, it makes sense
to say that one is obliged to keep a law; it also makes sense to
say that the lawmaker is obliged to enforce his law by punishing offenders; but it makes no sense to say that one is obliged
in justice to receive a punishment. For in that case, all pardons (and all redemptions!) would be unjust. Finally, if one
wishes to say that the guilty party has some weaker, quasimoral obligation to welcome the punishment due for his offense, one must first establish that Mary was a guilty party,
i.e. that she sinned in Adam. But we have already seen that
this is impossible. "To sin in Adam" and "to contract original
sin" are always idem in re, though they differ ratione. Were
this not so, that is, were it possible to call Mary a sinner-inAdam on some other basis than a contraction of original sin,
then her non-contraction would leave her a sinner. She would
be simul justa et peccatrix, and the Immaculate Conception
would be Lutheranized in meaning-a case of extrinsic justification!
1.4.9. Thus we have seen that the debitum alleged in Our
Lady cannot mean legal or moral obligation to obey a just
ordinance and hence cannot mean "subjection" to a law in
this sense. What remains? ·
1.5.0. Well, if one strips away the notions of legal or moral
duty, "subjection" to a law means only one thing: it means belonging to the set of objects upon which the law operates-that
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is, the set of objects which fulfill those initial or boundary conditions under which the law has predictive force. Hence Our
Lady will have been "subject" to the laws of original sin's
transmission, if and only if she was a member of the set of persons tor whom Law II holds, or Law III, or both. Thus debet
ceases to be a deontic operator and reduces to ordinary, nomological necessity.
1.5.1. In this restricted sense, then, <:an it be said that Our
Lady was "subject" to the operation of Law II? The reader
will recall that Law II said: "if Adam sins, both he and all
those in solidarity with him will be characterized by [a, b,
c. ...
]"

1.5.2. The answer is already clear from what has been said.
The term "solidarity," as used in this formula, was defined
above (note 8) as that mystical bond whereby we can be said
to have died in Adam through his sin. Thus everyone having
"solidarity" with Adam in this sense must be said (in an older
terminology) to have sinned in Adam. But nothing of the
kind can be said of Our Lady. Hence she is not a member of
the class of persons subject to the operation of Law II.
1.6.0. But can it be said that Our Lady "should" have been
subject to the operation of Law II, that is, that Law II should
have predicted the outcome in her case? The debitum-defender
will have to make this claim, and he might do so on several
grounds. Thus:
( 1) Mary was a descendant of Adam, therefore she should
have been in solidarity with him, hence subject to Law II.
(2) Mary was naturally begotten by sinful parents, themselves descended from Adam and in solidarity with him; hence
she should have been subject to Law II.
( 3) Mary in fact was in solidarity with Adam, hence was
subject to Law II in principle, although God made her an exception to it in fact.
1.6.1. The first and second of these grounds are plainly
absurd. They both amount to saying that because Mary ful-
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filled at least one necessary condition for the contraction of
original sin, she ought to have fu]blled the sufficient condition
also and hence contracted. This is to assert that every queen
"ought" to be a harlot, because she fulfills at least two necessary conditions for being a harlot, namely, she is a human being
and a woman.
1.6.2. Nevertheless, despite their absurdity, the first and second of these grounds bring to light a powerful psychological
basis for the debitum's plausibility. We are creatures of routine.
We observe regularities and proceed by trial and error (or by
theological reasoning) to formulate the laws which account
for those regularities; and in doing so, we often mistake necessary conditions for sufficient ones; then, when an event which
our inadequate law-formula failed to predict shatters the expected routine, our first reaction is one of discomfort. We ai:e
annoyed that our formula did not hold; and, despite the facts,
we claim that the law "ought to have held." But this claim
need not be a petulant exclamation. If we move from psychological considerations to epistemological ones, the statement,
"This law ought to have held," can be taken as making two
very different claims, depending on whether the referent of
"this law" is the law-formula or the law-in-the-real.
1.6.3. On the one hand, if "this law" refers to one of our
formulas, then the claim is not only significant but highly
important for the progress of science (even a science like the~
ology) . After all, it is vital to know which of our current
formulas has been falsified by the new fact, so that we can
know just whid1 of our formulas requires correction. If we
could not make this claim about some one of our formulas,
there would be no sure way to assimilate any new fact into
the corpus of existing science, because there would be no way to
correct that corpus methodically in the light of experience (or,
for that matter, in the light of a new dogmatic definition) .
Thus, taken in this sense, the claim, "This law ought to have
held," does recognize a "debitum" but it attaches the debit11m
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precisely to the formula; its force is to point out the gap between what we say (the formula) and what we need to explain; thus the effect of the debitum is to falsify the formula in
question.
1.6.4. On the other hand, if "this law" supposes for the order which obtains in rerum natura, then the claim, "This law
ought to have held," is patently self-contradictory. For, as a
counterfactual, the claim presupposes that the real law did not
hold; hence it presupposes that what obtains in reality does not
obtain in reality.
1.6.5. It is difficult to avoid the suspicion that serious confusion over the suppositio of "law" lies just beneath the surface of many arguments in favor of the debitum peccati. Isn't
it historically the case that such a debitum was "discovered"
when the fact of the Immaculate Conception, no longer deniable, contradicted some cherished theological formula? And
wasn't this debitum thereupon, without further ado, posited in
the real, as though the formula had been the real law, which
thus both obtained (hence the real debitum) and didn't obtain
(hence the non-contraction) ? As soon as a real regularity or
law is allowed both to obtain and not obtain, theology acquires
all the well-known curiosities of the debitum debate: subjections which don't subject, obligations which don't oblige, necessities which don't necessitate.
1.6.6. Consider the argument advanced by Fr. Armand Plessis,
S.M.M.18 His major is that every normally begotten human
necessarily contracts original sin. The minor is that Mary is
normally begotten human being. He concludes that Mary
was, therefore, "under a necessity" to contract-which "necessity" is her debitum. But this conclusion has nothing to do
with the premises. If it is true that every member of the class
of "normally begotten humans" necessarily contracts original

a

1 8 A. Plessis, S.M.M., Man11el de Mariologie Dogmatiqtte (Montfortsur-Meu, 1947) 62.
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sin, it follows either that Mary is not a member of this class
(which Plessis denies) or else that Mary actually contracts the
sin (which he also denies). Hence his position is simply inconsistent. But the inconsistency is disguised by a number of
suppressed premises. The real structure of an argument of this
kind is the following:
(1) The conclusion of a sound syllogism ought to hold;
(2) the following is a sound syllogism: (here, the debitumdefender may insert a syllogism he likes, for example:)
(a) children of parents stained with original sin are
begotten in the same state,
(b) Mary is a child of parents stained by original sin,
(c) Therefore, Mary is begotten in the state of original sin.
(3) Therefore, (c) ought to hold even though,- de facto.
it doesn't;
- ( 4) and this "ought to" is the debitum peccati.
_
1.6.7. Frankly, this reasoning can only be called preposterous.
In any logic I know, if the conclusion of a syllogism is false
in fact, there is something wrong with the premises. That much
is elementary. In the present case, it is clear that the major
(a) is faulty because it states a necessary but not sufficient condition for contraction. But as soon as one amends the major
to read correctly ( c£. Law II), it is dear that the minor (b),
as stated, is insufficient to yield a conclusion. Hence the basis
for the debitum vanishes.
1.7.0. I think it is time for a brief pause to gather together
the threads of what has been proved so far. First of all, there
are three gound-rules which any attempt to deduce the debitum
must respect. They are:
( 1) Our Lady's debitum must emerge as a theological conclusion, hence follow as a bona consequentia from premises
at least one of which is revealed.
(2) The precise notion of a debt or "obligation to contract"
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original sin is not revealed, hence cannot be presupposed in the
proof but must itself emerge as a bona consequentia from
revealed data.
(3) It is excluded that Our Lady deserved original sin on
the ground that she sinned in Adam or was duty-bound to obey
a just ordinance.
1.7.1. Now, I submit that these ground-rules make any plaus-

ible, theological proof for the debitum impossible to construct.
The reason is simple. So long as rule (3) is obeyed, the obligation in question can only be conceived as Our Lady's belonging to a class which regularly contracts original sin. Two such
classes would be "descendants of Adam" and "offspring of
parents themselves having original sin." The reader is free to
think of others. However, whenever one makes the major of the
syllogism read,"all members of this class contract original sin,"
and the minor, "Mary is a member of this class," the syllogism
is eo ipso false because Mary's belonging to the class falsifies
the major. But as soon as one amends the major to read, "all
members of this class ought to contract original sin," one assumes what needs to be proved. Finally, if one adopts the
desperate measure of adding a proviso to the major, so that it
reads, "all members of this class contract original sin unless
God intervenes," no conclusion follows at all. The major,
whrch is the "law," loses all deductive power. How, then, is
the "ought" or the "obligation" ever to get into the proof, without being smuggled in as above, metalinguistically, in the absurd daim that a bad syllogism "ought to hold" even when it
doesn't?
. 1.7.2. After all, there is hardly a more familiar mistake than
false generalization based on inadequate induction. Indeed,
theology offers an instructive parallel. Prior to the revelation of
the virginal conception of Jesus, a logician would have noted
the universal conjunction of being-a-virgin with not-being-amother. If 'a', 'b', 'c', etc., are distinct particular women, our

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/marian_studies/vol29/iss1/12

24

Marshner: A Logician's Reflections on the Debitum

158

A Logician's Reflections on the Debitrtm

logician (had he been acquainted with modern symbolic conventions) would truly have written:
( 1) 'a is a virgin &-(a is a mother),' 'b is a virgin &( b is a mother),' etc.,
for every known particular (where '-' is negation) . The facts
would have seemed to justify turning the conjunction into a
strict implication:
·
( 2) 'a is a virgin >- (a is a mother) ', etc.,
where '>' is strict implication. The same facts would have
seemed to justify replacing the individual constants with a
bound variable in universal quantification (anybody, everybody). The result would have been:
(3) Vx (xis a virgin > -(xis a mother)),
where 'V' is the universal quantifier ("all"). There at last is
the general "law" which applies to all cases, abstracting from
individuals (a, b, etc) without prescinding from them. Hence
from (3) as a premise, (2) is correctly deducible. But now
let 'a' have as its referent the Virgin Mary. Then from (3) it
follows necessarily that
( 4) The Virgin Mary is not a mother.
Alas, de facto she is a mother. But shall our logician say that
she was "under a necessity" not to be a mother? Unwilling to
alter his original induction and stubbornly committed to ( 3),
shall he posit a debitum non_-maternitatis? If so, he resembles
the defenders of a certain other debitum and falls under the
stricture of the beautiful Akathist Hymn:
Rhetoric's many followers were mute as fish when they saw thee,
0 Mother of God; for t!:hey dared not ask: How canst thou bear a
child and yet remain a virgin? But we marvel at this mystery, and
with faith cry:
Hail, Vessel of the wisdom of God; ha:il, .treasury of His foreknowledge.
Hail, thou that showest philosophers fools; ha:il, thou that
provest logicians illogical.
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The point is that, from a logical point of view, there is no
formal difference between the fallacious step by which
(3) Vx (xis a virgin>-(x is a mother ) )
is reached and the fallacious step by which
(5) Vx (xis a naturally begotten descendant of sinful Adam
> x contracts original sin)
is reached. In both cases, the step to a bound variable in universal quantification is falsified by fact and by the same person.
And in both cases, a "debitist" position arises from refusing to
admit the logical consequence of the factual falsificationnamely, the falsehood of ( 3) and ( 5) as they stand. There
can be little doubt that the reason why this formal parallel
has not been faced historically is the material difference that,
whereas the falsification of (3) could be taken as an ordinary
case of a miracle "breaking" a law of the merely natural order,
the falsification of ( 5) could be taken as a supernatural "exception" to a supernaturallaw. 19
1.8.0. The force of these considerations will emerge more
clearly, and in a new light, if we return now to consider the
19 In reality, of course, this material difference is neither here nor there.
For in both cases one must revise theory in the light of falsifications, and
in both cases the revision faces two basic methodological options: either
to abandon the law totally, or else to supplement it, in effect, by positing
more restrictive boundary conditions. In the case of (3) and other miraculous occurrences, Catholic philosophers have usually (and wisely) preferred the latter course: the law remains but is supplemented by a restriction limiting its validity to objects subjected exclusively to natural causalities. Then objects subjected to divine causality lie outside its boundaries.
In the case of (5), one could proceed in just the same way: keep the law
but supplement it with a restriction to the supernatural order. Then an
object subject to causalities of the hypostatic order will lie outside its
boundaries. (Then Mary has no debitum save, perhaps, that of being
filled with grace.) In the present essay, however, the author has taken
the alternative option of arguing that (5) is simply false in that it mistakes a necessary condition for a sufficient one. There are no other
methodologically coherent options, and the debitum peccati disappears
under either coherent one. These points will be developed somewhat more
fully in the next few sections.
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third ground, mentioned above in 1.6.0., for saying that Our
Lady "should" have been subject to Law II. The third ground
was this: Mary really was in solidarity with Adam, hence really
did fulfill the sufficient condition for contracting sin; therefore
she was subject to Law II in principle, although God made her
an exception to it in fact. 20
1.8.1. This approach raises again the question of -what we are
to mean by a "law" in this context. Because Law II is not the'
sort of law which those subject to it can break, it was suggested
above that this "law" is analogous to a regularity of nature. It
is somewhat similar to the law of gravity. But such laws do not
admit of exceptions. If, for example, the desk before me should
suddenly begin to levitate in apparent defiance of the law of
gravity, one would have to say, after duly establishing the fact,
one (and only one) of two things. (a) First, one might say that
the "exception" is evidence of some hitherto undiscovered but
natural restriction on the operation of the law; and in that
case, the result would have to be a reformulation of the law
and its boundary-conditions. Thus the so-called exception
would not be an exception to the true law, correctly formulated,
but an instance of it. In Mary's case, her non-contraction of
[a, b, c. . .], would prove either that the formula of Law II
should never have been applied to _her case, or else that the
formula was incorrect. Thus the Immaculate Conception would
20 Be it noted that the term "exception" can be taken in two ways.
In one way, the 'exception' simply means the 'unusual.' If among a million blacks, one fellow is an albino, he is certainly an exception. But
he has no debitrtm negritrtdinis. So, in the sense of what is uncommon,
unusual, odd, rare, or unique, one can certainly say that the Blessed Virgin
is an exception-without thereby implying any debitum. And in the same
sense, to say that God made her an exception is simply to say that God
made her what she is-unique.
In a second sense, however, the 'exception' is what is 'exempted from
the rule.' In this sense, to 'make an exception' means not merely to make
an unusual result, but to break a rule in order to get the result (whether
or not the result is particularly unusual). When used by the debitumdefender, of course, the term "exception" always has this second sense.
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either invalidate Law II as here stated or else prove that Mary
was not subject to it. Either way, the debitum vanishes. (b)
Alternatively, one might say that the breach of the law was
not due to any natural agency but was supernaturally caused.
If so, the levitation of my desk is a miracle and has nothing to
do with the law of gravity in its correct formulation. For no
one suggests that the laws of physics ought to be formulated
so as to account for and predict causalties which transcend
their boundary conditions, that is, transcend the natural order.
But Law II is supposed to predict a regularity of the supernatural order. Hence to posit the Immaculate Conception as a
supernatural "exception" to it is, once again, to invalidate the
law, as formulated, within its own order.21 Thereupon the
question arises as to how Law II could be reformulated so as
to read correctly. And to this question, there is only one answer: one would have to add a proviso, such as "unless God intervenes." But the addition of such a proviso, however worded,
has a devastating effect upon the whole pro-debitum argument,
as has already been noted. For it results in a "law" from which
nothing relevant can be deduced.
1.8.2. At this point the debitum-defender might raise an apparently serious objection. Granted that a formula like Law II
is in some ways analogous to a law of nature, nevertheless in
other important ways, it is not. For example, it does not operate by blind physical necessity. As a product of God's wisdom,
it is subject to His will. Thus, just as a human law-giver can
act personally to make intelligent exceptions to his laws, without thereby invalidating them, so also God can make an exception in the case of Our Lady. Indeed, the debitum only
means that He did have to make an exception.
Will anyone argue that the law of the supernatural order (Law II)
was supervened in Mary's case by. a Law of the hypostatic order? If
so, of course, her real subjection was to the higher law. Thus the
debitt~m peccati would vanish, to be replaced by a debitrtm gratiae. Cf.
Marian Stttdies 28 (1977) 185, n. 11 with the reference to St. Pius X's
encyclical Ad diem illttm (Acta Sanctae Sedis 36 [1904} 456).
21
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The correct way to answer this objection is to accept the first
part of it and reject the second.
1.8.3. As to the first part, it is absolutely true that original
sin's transmission is a mysterious arrangement which is only
imperfectly illuminated by the analogy of "law." And this imperfection remains whether one takes the laws of parliament
or the laws of physics as the prime analogate. But here the
debitum-defender must be on his guard. It is his case, not mine,
which requires the legal analogy, because it is his contention,
not mine, that Mary was "subject to a law" by virtue of whose
operation all those subject to it contract original sin. Now, just
because the debitum-defender must rely on the legal analogy,
even while recognizing that it is only an analogy, it is his duty
to beware of the equivocity of the term "law" in human usage.
He must decide which sort of law supports the analogy; and
having made his choice, he must adhere to it. He must not
shift back and forth, from sort to sort, as convenience in controversy dictates.
1.8.4. Now, as to the second part of the objection we are
considering, the debitum-defender has seen the awkwardness
of analogizing from the laws of physics, namely, that this analogy deprives him of the useful term "exception." · For, as we
have seen, to say that an event was an "exception" to a lawformula is only to posit a relation of reason between a failed
formula and the event it failed to predict, while the real law,
is, by definition, the law which does not fail, hence has no "exceptions." Therefore the debitum-defender now proposes that
Law II may be analogous to social legislation after all, because
it may admit of exceptions in the hands of an all-wise Administrator. Will this new analogy survive inspection?
1.8.5. I think not. Why, after all, does a human legislator
make unwritten "exceptions" to his laws? He does so because
he cannot, when promulgating the law, foresee all the unusual
cases which may arise and which may tum the observance of the
law into a hardship which he did not intend to impose. Hence,
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one reason for the exceptions is a defect in the original understanding of the consequences of the law; and the other reason
for exceptions consists in the tacit qualifications which the legislator implicitly intended but did not think to write down in the
law itself (and could not have written down without making
the law too complex to be humanly manageable). Therefore,
in the human analogate there is a temporally prior promulgation, accompanied by imperfect understandings and unformulated qualifications, all of which form the necessary "background" against which the unforeseen case can figure as an
"exception." But in God there is neither time, nor defect of
understanding, nor unformulated intention. The case to which
the law will not be applied is foreseen just as clearly and just
as eternally as the law itself. Therefore, if the analogy is to
survive, the "promulgation" of Law II as covering Mary's case
must enjoy a purely logical priority in God over His decree of
the Immaculate Conception. Hence the historical appeal to the
signa rationis.
1.9.0. That this appeal, generally the last resort of the prodebitum position, necessarily fails on Thomistic principles may
be shown by a short argument conducted entirely on those prinCiples. For a Thomist, the crucial issue is not the order of priority and posteriority among the signa, as is often supposed; in
fact this order is crucial only for a Scotist. Rather, for a
Thomist, the crucial issue is what is required for a will to be
efficacious. Let us see why this is so.
1.9.1. At the outset, it must be admitted that Our Lady's
being foreseen in solidarity with Adam (that is, as a member
of the class of persons for whom Adam is mystical head and
sign) amounts to a subjection to Law II and hence amounts
to a debitum, if and only if she is thus attained by God in an
efficacious will. For it is only in an efficacious will that Law II
is "in force," hence is a law, hence has subjects. Therefore, if
there is to be a debitum, Our Lady must be attained in an efficacious will precisely and simply as a member of the class in
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/marian_studies/vol29/iss1/12
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solidarity with Adam, hence as subject to an efficaciously willed
Law II.
1.9.2. Now hear what John of St. Thomas says about efficacious wills (the translation is my own) :
"Among the efficacious wills themselves, one should not distinguish the signa or priorities on the basis of those things
which are necessarily presupposed for efficacity, as, for example, that something be attained first under a common or
abstract ratio, then under more concrete and individuated conditions. For an efficacious will, qua efficacious, attains nothing
under abstraction. And so it is not the case that, prior to the
efficacious decree Of the Incarnation, there was already an Incarnation willed in abstraction from passible vs. impassible
flesh, from redemptive vs. non-redemptive role, etc. Rather,
whenever an efficacious will is posited under any priority, its
object has to be attained under that condition and disposition
by which it looks to existing and in fact is, both under an individual condition and under those other conditions without
which, in itself, it cannot be determinately conceived, so as to
be posited in fact. For efficacity essentially deals with and
looks to esse, and does not prescind from it, and hence looks
to individuation. Therefore the priorities in efficacious decrees
have to be assigned according to the different orders of dependencies or causalities, according to which one thing ( logically) precedes and is called "prior to" another de facto and
in itself-not according to priorities of abstraction and contraction, which rather serve to remove the thing from the order of
efficacity." 22
1.9.3. Obviously, this rule for ordering the signa was formulated by John of St. Thomas in response to the Scotist challenge.
The rule is designed to eliminate the Scotist way of assigning
an absolute priority to the Incarnation without exhaustively de2 2 John of St. Thomas, Crmm Theol., disp. 25, nn. 48 and 49; ed.
Solemnes, III, 158-159.
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termining the "Incarnation" thus priorized. At issue here is the
fundamental difference between the two metaphysics. If "formalities" are actually distinct ex parte rei, then real beings can
be constituted by a series of efficacious decrees which add formality to formality, down to the last haecceitas. But if the
"formalities" are only rationes of what is simply itself in re,
and if they become distinct only by a distinctio rationis ratiocinatae, then no such series of efficacious decrees is possible;
the series must be reduced to a single decree which, qua efficacious, can attain only a fully determinate object.
Therefore, obviously, on Thomistic principles there can be
no efficacious will of God which attains Mary simply, and
solely, "under the title" of solidarity with Adam. For, as attained under this. title, she is merely an instance of a class,
that is, someone attained under a common or abstract ratio.
1.9.4. Objicies: Being in solidarity with Adam formally includes the ratio of being a subsistent in human nature. But
to be "subsistent" is to be fully terminated in the line of substance and hence in immediate disposition to existence. Therefore Mary, even as attained solely under the title of solidarity
with Adam, is sufficiently individualized to be the object of
an efficacious decree.
1.9.5. Distinguo majorem: that solidarity with Adam, ut
concepta, includes or presupposes subsistence in signified act,
concedo; includes the concreteness necessary for efficacity,
nego. Et nego consequens. The concept of an incarnate Logos,
simply as such, also includes the concept of a subsistent in
human nature. But in order to have real determination, it remains to specify every property which the thing must either
have or not have in its first moment of existence, in order to
exist at all. Hence, if the merely signified subsistence included
in the concept of an Incarnation which abstracts from passible
vs. impassible flesh, etc., does not suffice for individuationas John of St. Thomas insists it does not-neither does the
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/marian_studies/vol29/iss1/12
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signified subsistence of a Mary conceived in abstraction from
the privileges.
1.9.6. lnstas: It is permitted, however, to assign an order
of priority among efficacious wills on the basis of any causal
order,. or order of real dependency, of one thing upon another.
But the supernatural presupposes and depends upon the natural. (And the reverse is also sometimes true, as John of St.
Thomas remarks elsewhere in the section excerpted.) Hence
there can and must have been an efficacious decree determining
Mary to exist as a human being, in this flesh and these bones,
begotten at this time from these parents, etc., prior to the efficacious decree determining her supernatural privileges. Atqui,
to receive the nature by natural generation from parents living
post lapsum Adae entails receipt of the nature as tainted from
Adam. Ergo, there can and must have been an efficacious decree establishing Mary's subjection to original sin prior to the
efficacious decree exempting her therefrom.
1.9.7. Respondeo I: Nego minorem: to descend from Adam
by natural generation is a necessary condition for contracting
the sin but not the sufficient condition. Therefore, the prior
efficacious decree determining Mary's existence in the natural
order is neither per se nor per accidens a decree subjecting her
to Law II. Let us be clear about this: the decree determining
whatever is necessary to Mary's concrete existence in the natural
order, even if it is logically prior to the decree determining her
privileges, does not establish a debitum contrahendi peccatum,
unless one also assumes the caro infecta theory or some similar
theory which makes descent from sinful Adam by natural generation the sufficient condition for contraction. Absent this additional assumption, the order of decrees proves nothing. We
shall discuss below the tenability of the caro infecta and similar devices. Here it will suffice to conclude with an alternative
response.
1.9.8. Respondeo II: Nego majorem: Of all the worlds God
could have created, He chose to create one in which man is
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ordained to grace. Therefore, no efficacious will determining
any man to exist within this chosen world can determine him
to exist according to nature alone, abstracting from graced vs.
non-graced. Therefore, every efficacious divine will determining
a man to exist within this chosen world must determine him
to exist, in the first ·instant of his existence, either with grace
or else without it; and if his existence is to begin post lapsum
Adae, then the absence of grace is already privation of grace
in solidarity with Adam. There simply is no state called "subjection to sin" in which an efficacious decree could posit a human being, intermediate between contracting sin and having
grace. If this is admitted, then let us for the sake of argument
also admit the minor which the debitum-defender alleges. Let
us admit, in other words, that descent from an Adam-who-hadsinned, by natural generation, suffices per se for that absence
of grace which is the contraction of sin. We now face the
following situation: there is a (logically) first efficacious decree in God which determines Mary to exist in human nature
in the first instant without grace, hence in original sin (not
just subject to it, but in it) ; and there is a second efficacious
decree in God which determines Mary to exist in the same human nature and in the same first instant with grace. Patet
contradictio.
1.9.9. Observe that there is no way to remove the contradiction without also removing the debitum. For example, one cannot make the first-willed sin a property of the nature, and the
second-willed grace a property of the person, because efficacious
wills don't posit mere natures, and because mere natures neither
have nor contract sin.23 Of course, one could remove the con23 Hence, a correct understanding of efficacious volition is fatal to. the
so-called debitum remotrtm, if the latter is supposed to attach not to the
person but to the nature. For outside efficacious decrees there are no
debita; and inside such decrees there are no mere natures.
· Moreover, a theory of the debitum remotttm faces insoluble logical
problems. Is the debitum a property of the nature as such? But no
property of a nature qtta nature can be attributed to the bearer of the
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tradiction by making one or the other will a voluntas simplex
or antecedens. But which will is to be removed from efficacity?
Not the second, s~rely, because the Immaculate Conception actually occurred. Then the first. But if the first will is non-efficacious, it involves no law as actually in force, or at least no
efficacious subjection to it, hence no mandated contraction,
hence no debitum. The only way to keep both decrees efficacious, and yet avoid contradiction, is to imagine that the law
involved in the first decree included an explicit proviso allowing
for non-contraction (perhaps whenever God willed, or perhaps
only when the "subject" was to be the Mother of God). But
on that assumption Mary is both subject to the law and by that
fact alone not obliged to contract. Hence, no debitum.
1.9.10. In summary, the attempt to argue from an analogy
which would permit Law II to be the sort of law which admits of "exceptions" fails under the unique conditions which
must be posited in God. Therefore, there is no ground fot
saying that Mary either was or should have been subject to
Law II.
1.10.0. Can it be said that Our Lady was (or should have
been) subject to Law III? The reader will recall that the term
"natural generation" was defined above (note 9) in a way
broad enough to cover every form of reproduction which preserves descent from Adam, except the case of a generation
which even though preserving descent from Adam, would be
nature. For such a move would be formally equivalent to the following
obviously false syllogism; Man is a species; Socrates is a man; therefore
Socrates is a species. Hence, on this interpretation, it will be impossible
to say, "Mary [or any other particular person] has a debit11m remotttm."
In modern parlance, such an assertion will be a category mistake; in
Scholastic parlance, a confusion in mppositio.
If it is objected that the debitttm remotrtm is not in this sense a "property"
of the nature but is rather an aspect predicable along with the nature,
it will follow that "man" is never predicable of any individual unless
"debet contrahere'1 is predicable along with it. In that case, the debitum
remotum really becomes a debitum personate; worse, it follows that either
Christ is not true man or else He, too, has a debitum.
·
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supernatural quoad substantiam. Thus Mary's mode of being
begotten falls within the definition of "natural generation."
1.10.1. However, it has also been argued that this natural
generation from Adam is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the contraction of original sin. Therefore Law III,
as here formulated, includes the additional requirement that
the children thus naturally generated be in "solidarity" with
Adam, that is, that they be subjects of the mystical relation
to Adam as moral head, whereby their own grace stands or
falls with Adam's. Now, since it has been shown that Mary
is not a subject of this mystical relation, it follows that she is
not subject to Law III as here formulated.
1.10.2. Nevertheless, the debitum-defender may well· ask
whether the law-formulas adopted here do not "eliminate"
the debitum peccati only by the rough and arbitrary procedure
of defining it away. Is it really legitimate, he may ask, to distinguish our mystical solidarity with Adam from our biological
solidarity of seminal containment in Adam, in such a way
that the two can be really separated by God-separated not
only in theory (de potentia absoluta) but also in providential
fact, in the case of Our Lady? For even if we grant that Adam's
sin is the 11causa unica" of our own contraction, nevertheless,
given that he did sin, is not our seminal containment in him
the very bond which suffices, of itself, to assure that we also
contract sin? Why, then, invent a second bond? Furthermore,
is it not clear from the whole tradition of the Church that original sin is contracted in and with the receipt of human nature
by natural means? Is it not also clear that the soul itself is
free of original sin until it informs the matter which, alone, is
actually derived from Adam? Therefore, given only that Adam
did sin, must we not look precisely to the metaphysical structure of natural generation, in order to find the cause of the
soul's pollution? In a word, peccato Adae praesupposito, is
not descent from him by natural generation the sufficient condition for our contraction of his sin?
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/marian_studies/vol29/iss1/12
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1.10.3. To answer this important objection, it will be wise
to begin with some remarks regarding the terms "cause" and
"sufficient condition." I have not spoken in this paper of the
"cause" of peccatum originate originatum, except when citing
another author (above, note 15). I have preferred instead to
speak of necessary and sufficient conditions, so as to secure a
less ambiguous terminology. We may illustrate with a commonplace example.
1.10.4. It is well known that sunlight, focused through a lens,
will cause a piece of paper to burn. The sunlight is the "cause."
But if we try the experiment on a sunny day, and nothing happens, we may find that we do not have a powerful enough
lens. We fetch another; and when fire results, we say that the
lens is the "cause." Someone else may try the experiment on
a sunny day, with the right kind of lens, but without result.
We point out to him that he is holding the lens too close to
the paper. When the position is corrected, and fire results,
we say that the proper focus is the "cause." Thus the term
"cause" is beset with ambiguity: in different situations, we
call different factors the "cause" of one and the same effect.
To avoid this situational ambiguity, it is standard practice in
the sciences to call only the whole set of necessary factors the
cause. Thus defined, "cause" is synonymous with "sufficient
condition." The sufficient condition is simply the set of necessary conditions. This empirical- scientific definition of "cause"
will serve for theology with minor amendments, the chief of
which is this: whereas the mathematicizing sciences often deal
with "events" in actu signato, metaphysics and theology are
concerned with events in actu exercito; hence, for our purposes,
the "cause" must be just that set of necessary and sufficient
conditions which obtained.
1.10.5. In our case, the event to be explained is the actual
receipt of original sin in some person, N. It has been argued
above that this event will occur if and only if all of the following factors are verified: (1) God's decree placing N in soliPublished by eCommons, 1978
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clarity with Adam, (2) Adam's sin, (3) the natural communication of human nature to N, such that as a result N is a human
person really related to Adam as ancestor. These three factors,
then, are the sufficient condition, and each of them separately
is a necessary condition. If all three are verified, N actually
receives the characteristics (a, b, c...}, which are the content
of peccatum originate ot·iginatum.
1.10.6. We must now examine the tenability of this view
in the light of an objection which amounts to two related claims.
The first claim is that more "necessary" conditions have been
enumerated here than are really necessary (the mystical bond
of solidarity being reducible to the biological bond) ; the second
claim is that human flesh itself, derived from Adam, carries
some sort of taint, such that when the soul informs that flesh,
the soul contracts original sin. The two claims are related in
that the second is a consequence of the first; for, if one eliminates the mystical bond as a separate factor, one must somehow find an explanation for contraction within the fallen"natural" process itself. The result is a kind of theological biology of the fallen state, with its caro infecta.
1.10.7. It is easy to refute the first of these claims by showing
that every plausible theology of original sin presupposes the
mystical bond as a distinct factor and cannot survive without it.
For let us suppose that concupiscence is a major component of
original sin and somehow plays a role in its transmission; let
us further suppose that concupiscence can be somehow explained in biological terms as an inheritable trait; it remains
true that to inherit concupiscence is not identically the same
as to contract original sin. One must also inherit the privation
of grace-an "inheritance" for which there is no biological
explanation of any kind, nor could there be without reducing
the mors animae to the natural order. Every adequate theology
of original sin must explain the fact that I inherit privation of
grace as a result of another man's sin, and no such theology
invokes natural generation as the sufficient condition-other-
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wise it would have to be admitted that ·I inherit the moral
effect of my own parents' actual sins. Why, then, do I inherit
the guilt of Adam's sin but not that of my immediate progenitors? It must be that I am bound up in solidarity with sinful
Adam in a way in which I am not bound up in solidarity with
my own sinful parents. Atqui, I am bound up with my parents
via descent from them by natural generation. Ergo descent by
natural generation must not be the only way in which I am
in solidarity with Adam. However, if a second mode of solidarity must be admitted, what can it be except the mystical
bond by which "many" were included in Adam? As in Adam
many died, so in Christ shall many be made alive. In both
cases, the decisive bond is mystical. Therefore, descent from
sinful Adam by natural generation cannot be the sufficient
condition for contracting original sin.
1.10.8. Here an objection might be raised: it seems that the
double bond theory makes God the real author of original sin
in us. Here we have two descendants of Adam by natural generation, Martha and Mary. · God declares that Martha is in
mystical solidarity with Adam and Mary is not. On what basis
does He discriminate? But if we let descent by natural generation suffice for contraction, God is not to blame.
1.10.9. I answer that the objection only postpones the problem. If natural descent suffices for contraction, Martha and
Mary both contract. But here is a Mary who doesn't contract.
Was she made an "exception"? Then God "discriminated"
in her favor. In short, neither theory eliminates the so-called
discrimination; but the debitum theory has the weakness of
having to appeal to "exceptions"-an appeal which we have
seen to be nonsense.
1.10.10. As to the second claim-that flesh derived from
Adam somehow pollutes the soul-it collapses as soon as one
realizes that even the material aspect of original sin (concupiscence) can be predicated only of the whole man and not
-of his parts. For concupiscence, as a disorder seated in the
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flesh, precisely qua disorder bespeaks relation to the rational
soul as formal cause of the composite. Absent the soul, there is
in the flesh neither order to its operations nor disorder. Thus,
even materially considered, original sin can be no more predicated of a gamete than it can of a corpse. Hence nothing is
gained by the classic appeal to "active" (vs. "passive") conception.
1.10.11. One must be clear on this point: the concrete species
as bio-historical community in solidarity with Adam is a community of persons, not a gene pool. Granted, the community
of persons presupposes a gene pool and hence a certain continuity of matter. But it does not consist therein. The species
as concrete community consists of its members, namely, the persons who are composites of body and soul. They alone are
"in" the species, and they alone are "descended" from Adam,
and only what is descended from Adam can either contract
or convey original sin.
1.10.12. Confusion on this point arises from a false dilemma
concerning the soul as created by God. One asks whether the
soul thus created, in the logical moment "before" it informs
the flesh, is already tainted with original sin. To avoid. making
God the author of sin, the question is answered in the negative.
But if the soul issues forth clean and becomes soiled, there
seems to be no alternative but to seek the contagion on the part
of the flesh. This false dilemma is dissolved as soon as one
sees that it involves a category mistake. Category mistakes
often arise when the properties of who~es are predicated of
parts. For example, from the fact that a chair is corp.fortable,
it does not follow that boards and nails are comfortable. And
from the fact that I have original sin, it does not follow that
either my flesh or my soul has it, taken as parts prior to their
union.
1.10.13. After all, original sin is a state consequent upon
solidarity with Adam, both moral and biological. This is why
original sin is a malady restricted to the human species taken
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concretely (that is, not only as metaphysical species but also
as biO:.historical community) .24 What lies ouside this species
(a stone, · an angel) cannot contract original sin. But St.
Thomas explicitly teaches that the soul, taken simply as created
and not "yet" informing organic matter, is not within the human species, because so taken it is only a part of man. 25 Parts
of wholes do not belong to the species of which only the wholes
as wholes are instances. Indeed, according to Aquinas, the
very "benefit" which the soul acquires in being united with its
matter is its speci.fication.2 e Hence the question whether the
soul, prior to informing matter, has original sin, is not to be
answered in the negative but to be rejected as a meaningless
question. Now: what holds for one part precisely sub ratione
partis must hold for other parts as well. Hence it is also
meaningless to locate original sin in any sense in the pre-animated matter. 27
1.10.14. From this it follows that original sin does not arise
formally in the soul by virtue of the soul's contact with matter,
as though the matter were some sort of medium through which
a contagion were conveyed. Rather, original sin arises in the
soul because the soul is now the substantial form of this person who happens to be in solidarity with Adam. Because the
person-to-be will be in solidarity with Adam, the soul acquires
Adam's sin when it is that person's soul and not before. God's
non-act of not conserving in being the grace of some person
24 A man created by God today ex nihilo would belong to the meta·
physical species, but not to the bio-historical community deriving from
Adam, and hence would not contract original sin.
2 5 St. Thomas, Qttestiones de anima, q. 1, ad 13.
26 St. Thomas, ibid., ad 12.
2 7 Will it be objected that original sin is in the matter not forma/iter
nor even matmaliter, but only virtttaliter? Perhaps, but only in this
sense: because it is the person who contracts sin, whatever contributes
constitutively to the existence o( the person contributes. to his existence in
sin. Therefore, in the same sense it would have to be said that original
sin is in the soul virtttaliter. Do the gametes participate in humanity
virtttaliter active ex parte cattsae? So does the soul.
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in solidarity with Adam has its negative "effect" only when
that person exists, thus when the soul has already produced
its "formal effect" of having informed this matter so as to
produce the composite which is hie homo. A fortiori, if a necessary condition for the reception of original sin in this soul
is descent from Adam, then since descent from Adam is a relation (to Adam as ancestor) which, as an accident, is consequent upon the existence of hie homo as term of the generative
act, it follows that neither grace nor sin can be predicated of
either constituent part of man prior to the existence of hie homo,
which is the formal effect of the soul ut reeepta. Therefore, it
makes no sense to ask whether the soul, simply ut ereata, is in
grace or in sin, and it also makes no sense to ask whether the
matter simply ut disposita is "infected." Hence there is no
earo infecta. Only the child himself, as existent, can fulfill a
necessary condition (descent from Adam) for God's non-conserving his grace in view of his mystical solidarity with Adam,
which is another necessary condition.
1.10.15. From these considerations it is evident that Our Lady
was not subject to Law III. She was not included in Adam
as moral or mystical head of the race; and absent this mystical
bond, her receipt of flesh derived from sinful parents, themselves included in Adam, is not a sufficient condition for her
own contraction of sin.
1.10.16. But can it be said that she "should" have been subject to Law III? The debitum-defender will have to answer
affirmatively, and he might do so on two distinct grounds:
(a) Our Lady should have been subject to Law III because
she should have been subject to Law II;
(b) Our Lady should have been subject to Law III because
flesh derived from sinful Adam was involved in her active
conception.
The arguments for both grounds have been eliminated already.
1.11.0. Therefore, the first half of this paper is finished.
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A survey of the data of faith regarding original sin and its
transmission has disclosed no tenable point of departure for
a theological proof of the debitum peccati. There simply is
no "owe," "ought," "had to," or "should have" for the debere
to express from this starting point.
2.0.0. However, the debitum-defender could assume the
alternative starting point. Instead of reasoning from original
sin (the so-called terminus a quo), he could reason from the
meaning of the Immaculate Conception itself ( the terminus
ad quem of Our Lady's redemption). The reasoning is considerably simpler by this route and might take either of two
forms.
2.1.0. First and most fundamentally, a case for the debitum
might observe that the Immaculate Conception is a redemption.
Atqui a redemption is a freeing, deliverance, or rescue. Such
terms strictly presuppose a predicament from which one is
delivered, rescued, etc. For, if one is not redeemed from some
predi:cament, one is not redeemed. In the context of Catholic
thology, this predicament must be the state of sin or alienation
from God_. Therefore, whoever is redeemed must have been
in a state of sin-either actually or potentially. From the universal, one may infer the particular: if Mary is redeemed, she
must have been in a state of sin-either actually or potentially.
The dogma of 1854 eliminates, of course, the former possibility
(that she was actually in sin) but not the latter. Indeed, the
prima facie wording of the dogma implies her potential state
of sin by calling her redemption a "preservation." For there
is no preservation save from a potential (indeed, imminent)
danger. The term "debitum peccati," whether felicitous or
infelicitous, simply denotes this subjection to an imminent
danger (or potential state) of sin. Therefore, since it must
be admitted that Our Lady was subject to this danger, it must
be admitted that she had a debitum peccati.
2.1.1. The above argument fails for two reasons: its minor
is methodologically incorrect, and its conclusion is unintelligi-
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ble. The minor ·proceeds incorrectly becaus~ it amounts to
the erroneous assumption that the entailments of a predicate
("redeemed") can be inferred from its etymology. The conclusion is unintelligible because, so long as the debitum is taken
as unconditional, there is no tenable answer to the question of
wherein this "danger" consists. These contentions will now
be defended, in reverse order.
2.1.2. Assume that the argument presented in 2.1.0. is sound.
If so, there existed some real subjection to danger or potentiality
for contraction of original sin in Mary's case. It is necessary to
say in what this real potentiality consisted, and (to this writer's
knowledge) there are but two candidates. One is the caro infecta'allegedly involved in Mary's active conception-an illusion dispelled above in l.lO.lO.ff. The other candidate, more
abstract, is Mary's "subjection to the laws"· of ~riginal sin's
transmission. But once these laws are correctly formulated
{l.l.O.ff.), and the relevant sense of "law" is clarified (1.4.1.ff.,
1.6.2.ff., 1.8.1.ff.), it becomes clear that no such subjection exists
in her case. Therefore, it becomes unexpectedly difficult to
say in what real factor this "subjection" or "potentiality" could
have resided. This fact strongly suggests that something has
gone amiss in the argument by which the existence of such
a reality was posited-a suspicion confirmed by a look at the
minor.
2.1.3. From the fact that deliverance from prison or a similar
predicament is the original or etymological sense of "redemption," it does not follow that such deliverance is the meaning
of the term in actual usage. Medieval linguistic philosophy
was already able to distinguish between etymology and usage
(e.g. St. Thomas's treatment of lapis, in Summa Theologiae
I, q. 13, a. 2, ad 2), but certain influential hermeneutical theories of the 19th and 20th centuries have tried to reach deeper
results ("primordial determinations") by blurring the distinction. Apart from Heidegger's curious renditions of the preSocratics, these theories have been ·applied mainly to the Bibhttps://ecommons.udayton.edu/marian_studies/vol29/iss1/12
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lical materials-with results which, from the standpoint of contemporary semantics, w.ill rarely bear inspection.28 The merit
of first recognizing the relevance of recent semantic method to
the problem of what "redemption" might mean in Our Lady's
case belongs to J.-F. Bonnefoy.29 Neither his factual findings
nor those of others (e.g. the usage of the term "redemption"
as applied to the angels) need be repeated here. 80 What matters
for present purposes is simply the undeniable upshot of their
researches, namely, that the actual usage of the term "redeemed" (and its cognates) in Scripture, the Fathers, and
Church documents is too fluid to give cogency to the argument
of the debitum-defender.
2.1.4. Moreover, it is both enlightening and amusing to note
the semantic parallel between "redeemed" and "created." Suppose that 'x is redeemed' presupposes a state of sin from which
x was delivered. By similar etymological evidence, 'x is created'
presupposes a nothingness or non-being from which x was
drawn. Then, just as maculism is the claim that 'xis redeemed'
entails 'there is a time, t, such that x was in sin at t,' so there
is a medieval theory of creation according to which 'x is created'
entails 'there is a time, t, such that x did not exist at t.'
Aquinas's attitude towards this theory is well known. While
admitting that creation involves a real relation, with the creature as subject, he assigns as term of the relation not an antecendent nothingness but the Necessary Being by Whom esse
is efficiently communicated to the creature. For Aquinas, then,
'to be created' means 'to have existence as an accident from
Another in whom existence is essential.' Hence 'x is created'
entails the logical contingency of 'x exists' but entails nothing
28 For a survey and devastating critique, see James Barr, The Semantics of Biblical Language (Oxford, 1961), esp. 107ff.
29 Cf. Bonnefoy, art. cit., in Ephemerides Mariologicae 4 (1954) 31lff.
3 Cf., e.g., Pedro de Alcantara Martinez, O.F.M., La redencion de
Marfa y los meritos de Cristo, in Estudios Franciscanos 55 (1954) 195253; Alejandro de Villalmonte, O.F.M.Cap., Marfa Inmacrtlada, exenta
del debito del pecado original, in Virgo Immacrtlata 11 (1957) 131.
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about the duration of that existence. Hence the fact that the
world had a beginning in time is taken by Aquinas as a datum
of faith distinct from the datum of creation itself and not deducible from it. If the Thomistic theory of redemption had
been less Augustinian and more closely modeled on the originality of Aquinas's theory of creation, redemption might have
been defined as 'to have grace through the merits of another'
- formula whereby reference to an antecedent lack of grace
would likewise have been replaced by preference to an extrinsic
meritorious cause of grace.. Then, at least, there would have
been no Thomistic case for maculism.
2.1.5. To press the parallel a step further: suppose it is
agreed that, if an entity which has its esse efficiently communicated to it ab alio is still "created," even though the communication take place from eternity, then a person whose grace is communicated to her ex merito alterius is still "redeemed," even
though the communication take place from conception. By
the debitist semantics of "redemption," however, it would
still follow that this person is redeemed if and only if she
has at least a real or natural potentiality for original sina debitum contrahendi peccatum. Pari ratione, there is again
a theory of creation according to which 'x is created' entails
that 'x of itself has a real potentiality for non-being' or tends
towards nothingness (a debitum non-essendi?). Shall we call
this a debitist theory of creation? Whatever we call it, it is
just the view of those Parisian theologians whom Cajetan considered too ignorant to be worthy of reply. 31 These gentlemen
had attacked Aquinas' orthodoxy because the Angelic Doctor
had maintained that there could be creatures (e.g., the angels
and heavenly bodies) which were immutable in the sense that
they had within themselves no potentiality for non-being. 32 The
line of attack is obvious: what cannot not-be, necessarily is;
u Cajetan, In Primam Partem, q. 9, a. 2, in fine.
32 St. Thomas, Srtmma Contra Gentiles, II, c. 30.
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hence Aquinas makes certain creatures necessary beings, in
which case they are no longer creatures-which is heresy.
2.1.6. Cajetan's reply (which is of the highest interest philosophically because it contrasts the logical issue of modal
operators with the metaphysical issue of act and potency)
richly deserves to be applied to the debitum controversy. It
consists of three points: ( 1) the attack envisages intrinsic potentialities only and hence fails to take extrinsic ones into account (i.e. though immutable in !e, the creature might be mutable through a power existing in alia) ; ( 2) the attack posits
in creatures a real potency which looks directly and primarily
to non-existence, whereas in fact there is no such potency in
anything (for, of course, non-being can hardly be the "act"
of any real potency); rather, what is properly in question is
whether every creature must, of itself, have a potency to some
esse incompossible with its present esse-to which the ariswer
is "no"l (3) most fundamentally, the attack confuses real with
logical possibility, and real with logical necessity. In both
usages "necessary" is defined as "not possibly not" l but real
necessity denies in the entity any component (e.g. matter)
which would persist through a substantial change and hence
have a potency to another esse, while logical necessity means
only that the terms of a proposition are so related that its negation is self-contradictory. Similarly, real possibility or potency
is a potency within the substance in question, whereas logical
possibility means only that the denial of a proposition is not
self-contradictory. Thus in real terms, there are necessary (immutable) and non-necessary (mutable) creatures;. but in logical terms, it can be said of every creature that it might riot be
(thus is logically non-nece.ssary). Finally, because it is said
that God has (de potentia absoluta) the power to bring about
whatever is logically possible, the logical possibility that 'a is
not,' where a stands for a particular creature, is correlated with
a real power in God to bring it about that a is not (i.e. to annihilate a)- without there being in a itself any real potency to
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be other than it is. Similarly, in Marian theology, no one denies
that the proposition, "Mary is immaculately conceived," is a
contingent proposition and that God had the power to bring it
about that she was not so conceived, had He willed it. Hence
the logical possibility of "Mary contracts original sin" is not
in question. What distinguishes debitism is its insistence on a
real possibility over and above the logical one.
2.1.7. The peculiar difficulty of saying wherein this real
possibility consists has already been noted, and we may now
add a further explanation of the difficulty: real possibilities
are transcendentally relative to real acts, but a non-being (privation or disorder) such as original sin is not a real act. Therefore, there can be no such real possibility. Hence the debitist
semantics of 'redemption" leads to positing an absurdity-an
absurdity exactly parallel to the "innate tendency towards nothingness" which Cajetan mocked.
2.1.8. By contrast, a non-debitist semantics of "redemption"
is exactly parallel to the Thomist semantics of "creation." Mary
can be called "redeemed" simply because she does not of herself possess grace but has it from another (because there can
be no creature to whom grace is connatural) and through the
merits of another (because all the grace which has come into
the world has come through the merits of Christ) . Hence
"Mary is immaculate" is a contingent truth. Its negation is
contingently, not logically, false. Mary could be said to need
no redemption if and only if her elevation to grace were somehow necessary. The human soul of Jesus is elevated to grace as
a necessary effect of the hypostatic union, but nothing in Mary's
ontological make-up requires her grace. Her elevation is and
remains God's free gift.
2.1.9. Nothing in this argument is weakened or changed
by the additional qualification of "preservative" redemption.
"Preservative" expresses the fact that in Mary's unique case the
grace flowing from Christ's merits is communicated to her without there having been any antecedent state of sin in her. Grace
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and sin are related as contradictories (like light and darkness) ,
not as contraries. Unlike contraries, contradictories can only
replace each other without intermediacy. Hence the grace
coming to her simultaneously with her existence can be called
"preservative" because its existence in her was not preceded
by an actual state-of-sin and because its existence in her replaced any logically possible state-of-sin. The distinction between logical and real possibility is once again crucial; for it
is impossible to show that the ratio of "preservation" requires
anything more than logical possibility.
2.1.10. To confirm this point, it will be well to formalize
somewhat the very complex notion of "preservation." One
finds that one is dealing with a many-sided relation, involving
at least one agent (x) which preserves, an object(y) preserved,
an undesirable predicate (F) which y is preserved from having,
a predicate of integrity (G) which y has as a result of some
action of x upon y ( xRy), and hence (it is presupposed) a
predicate (H) which x has and by virtue of which xis able to
act upon y with the desired result ( Gy). In other words, what
counts as an instance of "preservation" is not some one thing or
property, but rather a whole causal situation. 33 One is dealing
with a causality of x upon y, but one calls this causality "preservation of y" if and only if the following additional conditions are met: the predicates F and G are mutually exclusive,
and it is at least sometimes better that a thing be G rather than
be F, and there was never a past time, tp, when the thing acted
upon was F (otherwise, one would have "restoration" rather
than "preservation"), and apart from this causality, it is at
least logically possible for the thing to be F (otherwise, one
might have a case of "immunity" or even "incorruptibility,"
but hardly "preservation").
The above account is intended to serve only for relatively

a

33 For the analysis of causality used here, see I. M. Bochenski, O.P.,
On Analogy, in The Thomist 11 (1948); reprinted in Albert Menne
(Ed.), Logico-Philosophical Strtdies (Dordrecht, 1962) 106.
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simple cases. More complex situations, such as those in which
the free cooperation of the party-to-be-preserved is required,
would have to involve some additional stipulations. Since
Mary's free cooperation was not required in her Immaculate
Conception itself, it seems possible to use this mystery as an
'interpretation' of the account here given. We replace the
variables 'x' and 'y' with individual constants 'a' and 'b' respectively; then let 'a' and 'b' stand for God and Mary respectively, 'R' for infusion of grace, 'F' for contraction of original
sin, and 'G' for being filled with grace.
Of the many things thus involved in the assertion of "preservation," the most crucial for present purposes is the logical
possibility of Fb (in our case, "Mary contracts original sin").
Since no Catholic theologian denies that God could have
brought it about that Fb, there is clearly a consensus that Fb
is at least logically possible. Further, before Gb ("Mary is filled
with grace") was true, it is excluded that Fb was ever true.
Now suppose that for a given domain of objects (e.g., human
beings descended from Adam) F and G are not only mutually
exclusive but also exhaustive alternatives. Then it will follow
that before Gb was true, if Fb was never true, b did not exist.
Atqui what does not exist has no real potencies or tendencies
of any kind. Hence on these suppositions, which are verified
in Mary's case, Fb is at most logically posible. (Only the untenable appeal to ca1'o infecta in Mary's active conception has
served historically to mask the validity of this conclusion.)
· 2.1.11. Therefore: since the logical possibility in question
means only that, if both Mary and original sin exist, "Mary
contracts original sin" is contingently, not logically, false; and
since this logical possibility is therefore not denied even by
those who reject all debitum in Our Lady, it follows that the
argument from the meaning of "redemption," if rightly carried
out, concludes only to what no one denies. Hence the argument
creates no basis for the debitum.
2.2.0. The second form which reasoning from the meaning
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of the Immaculate Conception itself might take, in order to
conclude to. a debitum of some kind, is still more direct. It begins with a truth which no Catholic can deny: apart from
God, there is no other cause of Our Lady's sinlessness-at-conception. Therefore it is perfectly true to say that Mary did not
contract original sin because God preserved her. Now, not by
syllogistic reasoning but by immediate inference, this causal
statement seems to justifiy another statement:

(A) Mary would have contracted <J1'iginal sin, if she bad
not been preserved.
This is the counterfactual conditional which was mentioned
in the introduction to the present essay. As soon as (A) is
admitted, it becomes possjble, even necessary, to raise a further
question: why would she have contracted the sin? If she
would have contracted it, there must be some reason why she
would have contracted it. Nothing happens without a reason.
Therefore, if she truly would have contracted, there must be
some cause by virtue of which she would have contracted sin,
if God had not caused the opposite. And so we have cause
against cause. Our Lady, it seems, was subject to two causalities--the one to make sin, the Other to make grace-so related
that if the Other had not preserved her, the one would have
corrupted her. This subjection to a corruptive cause is just the
meaning of her debitum. The nature of the corruptive caus~
whether something intrinsic to Mary's make-up (e.g. the ca1'o
infecta) or something extrinsic (e.g. a law conceived as some
sort of impersonal "force" existing in the real)-is left to
speculation. What is crucial is not the nature of the cause
but the necessity to posit one, if she truly would have contracted.
2.2.1. There is thus a peculiarity to the debitum proposed by
way of this argument. Unlike the previous versions, this debitum arises from a counterfactual conditional and requires
the use of such a conditional in its statement. Hence -it is often
called a debitum conditionatum or hypotheticum. But here one
Published by eCommons, 1978
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must note some ambiguities; for in fact to propose such a
debitum might be tantamount to any of three distinct claims.
2.2.2 First, one might be claiming that the conditions sufficient for anyone to contract original sin existed in Mary's
case in the actual world, so that she would have contractedindeed, would necessarily have contracted the sin-if only
events had taken their normal course.' On this view, the corruptive cause to which Mary was "subject" really existed and
would have borne its bitter fruits, if God had not "intervened."
Bu.t this claim (despite the cosmetic improvement of using
counterfactual phraseology) is the old piec~ of incoherence we
);lave remarked already at length, namely, the untenable claim
that a truly sufficient condition may obtain and yet its consequent not obtain (vide supra, 1.6.2-1.7.2) . Hence, if the debitum conditionatum amounts to, this first claim, it presents
nothing new and has been refuted already.
2.2.3. Secondly, one might be claiming only that the conditions sufficient for anyone to contract original sin might have
existed in Mary's case, and that if they had existed, she would
have had to contract the sin. On this view, the corruptive cause
is not alleged to have existed in Mary's case in the actual world;
hence she was not actually subject to such a cause but only potentially subject. In such a position, there are novel elements
not yet considered in this essay. Here the debitum-defender is
no longer obliged to allege a real potency in Mary. (Of course,
he might continue to do so; he might invent a remote real potency to have the proximate real potency to contract; but he
has no real need of such maneuvers.) He requires only the
logical possibility of some situation in which Mary contracts
necessarily. Then, if he can actually stipulate that situation by
stating it in the protasis of a counterfactual conditional whose
truth is certified, he establishes his case.
2.2.4. Thirdly, however, one might intend a still weaker
claim. One might wish to say only that, if some quite possible
circumstance had obtained, Mary would in fact have contracted
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original sin. Whether she would have been obliged or necessitated to do so is left in suspension. In other words, one might
wish to do no more than assert the truth of some conditional
formula whose apodosis is, "Mary would have contracted original sin."
2.2.5. It is open to question, however, whether so weak a
claim as this last any longer counts as a version of the debitum.
Many authors who deny all debitum in Our Lady have admitted
the truth of one or more counterfactuals of the type in question.
But here again the argument is beset by ambiguities. For example, so long as the debitum itself is taken to be some sort
of obligation in justice to contract the sin, one might rightly
deny that such an "obligation" makes any sense and yet affirm that there are circumstances under which Mary factually
"would have" contracted. In such a case, to hold that the ·admission of a conditional formula is not the admission of a
debitum (and is in fact consistent with the denial of all debitum) makes good sense. But suppose the debitum itself is
taken to mean only a conditional "necessity" to contract the
sin. In other words, suppose the debitum just means that there
is known to theology a sufficient condition, under which anyone contracts. Then the debitum conditionatum will mean only
that if that condition had been fulfilled in Mary's case, it
would have been sufficient in her case also; hence she would
have contracted the sin necessarily. In such a context, the assertion that a theologian may admit the truth of a conditional
formula while denying all debitum becomes rather suspect.
Does such a theologian mean to say that there is no sufficient
condition for the contraction of original sin? That there may
be one, but theology does not know it? That in the very situation in which Mary would contract sin, she would do so
merely as a matter of brute fact and not under the intelligibility
of a known law? Such claims are distinctly curious; one doubts
that any theologian has intended to make them. Hence, where
the debitum merely means a nomological necessity, and where

Published by eCommons, 1978

53

Marian Studies, Vol. 29 [1978], Art. 12
A Logician's Reflections on the Debit11m

187

the debitum conditionatum merely means that in some specifiable circumstance, Mary would have been subject to the law
and hence would have contracted necessarily, there is no sound
distinction between admitting the truth of an informative
(non-analytic) conditional formula and admitting the debitum
conditionatum.
2.2.6. Nothing advanced in this essay excludes the possibility
of such a debitum conditionatum. A forthcoming sequel to
this paper will set forth a general critique of Marian counterfactual formulae.
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